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    Abstract:  
This article analyses the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election manifestos of populist parties in V4 
countries as a contribution to the contemporary discussion on political populism. The aim of the study 
is to analyze the election campaign programs which populist parties operating in individual V4 countries 
presented for EP elections in 2019, using a qualitative content analysis of the official election programs 
of relevant populist parties and other sources of their communication. It tries to identify topics that have 
been framed as a problem or risk by Central European populists and how these topics have been 
interpreted in their programs. The so-called “immigration crisis” and the contemporary state of the 
European Union are seen as the most problematic topics by a majority of the populists. On the other 
hand, the majority of these parties do not want some Central European version of Brexit. Their rhetorical 
goal is rather the reform the Union. 
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 Título en Castellano: "¿Proteger la soberanía nacional de la UE?" Las elecciones al 
Parlamento Europeo de 2019 y los partidos populistas en los países V4 
        Resumen: 
En este artículo se analizan los manifiestos electorales para el Parlamento Europeo (PE) de 2019 de 
los partidos populistas de los países del grupo de Visegrado (V4) como una contribución al debate 
contemporáneo sobre el populismo político. El objetivo del estudio es analizar los programas de 
campaña electoral que los partidos populistas que operan en los distintos países V4 presentaron para 
las elecciones al PE en 2019, utilizando un análisis de contenido cualitativo de los programas 
electorales oficiales de los partidos populistas relevantes y otras fuentes de su comunicación. El artículo 
trata de identificar los temas que han sido enmarcados como un problema o riesgo por los populistas 
centroeuropeos y cómo estos temas han sido interpretados en sus programas. La llamada "crisis de la 
inmigración" y el estado actual de la Unión Europea son vistos como los temas más problemáticos por 
la mayoría de los populistas. Por otro lado, la mayoría de estos partidos no quieren una versión 
centroeuropea de Brexit. Su objetivo retórico es más bien la reforma de la Unión. 
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This article presents the analysis of the 2019 EP election manifestos of populist parties in V4 
countries. Furthermore, the article can contribute to the contemporary discussion on political 
populism that has become one of the most important debates within both political theory and 
comparative political science. Academics from many countries increasingly use the concept of 
populism to characterize numerous phenomena in modern politics.5 Populism is studied in 
connection to specific politicians,6 political parties7 or whole political regimes, which have 
adopted a populist rhetoric, style and method of governing.8 
This study moreover focuses on populist parties in V4 countries, i.e. in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Central Europe is a region which in recent years has 
been deeply touched by a trend known also in other Western European countries, i.e. the 
growing strength of populist parties which are entering to a large degree into government in 
Central Europe. One of the basic principles of populism is anti-elitism (see below). If a populist 
politician becomes a part of the ruling power, anti-elitist rhetoric very often shifts to a 
supranational level – such a politician is less capable of criticizing the national elite, of which 
he is a member, and therefore focuses on topics such as “Brussels”, which represents a certain 
metaphor of an “evil supranational elite which must be combatted.” This is also one of the 
reasons that populism is linked with Euroscepticism.9 
The elections held for the EP in 2019 allow for an interesting comparative view of 
populist parties in the context of the V4. Elections to the EP are so-called second-order 
elections,10 and according to a score of authors11 these are the elections where right and left 
extremist groups could be more successful. These parties apparently include populist parties, 
which often tend to be Eurosceptic.12 Paradoxically, these Eurosceptic parties often tend to be 
successful in the European elections.13 
The goal of this article is to analyze the election programs which populist parties 
operating in individual V4 countries presented for EP elections in 2019. We also attempt to 
identify topics that have been framed as a problem or risk on the part of Central European 
populists and the method in which these topics have been interpreted in their programs. We are 
interested in the similarities and differences not only among individual parties, but countries as 
well. The text should provide a complex view of what and how Central European populists 
 
5 See Mudde, Cas and Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal: “Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections 
on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 51, nº. 13 (2018), pp. 
1667–1693. 
6  Hawkins, Kirk A.: “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative perspective”, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 30, nº. 4 (2009), pp. 1040–1067. 
7 Havlík, Vlastimil and Voda, Petr: “Cleavages, Protest or Voting for Hope? The Rise of Centrist Populist Parties 
in the Czech Republic”, Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 24, nº. 2 (2018), pp. 161–168. 
8 Antal, Atilla: “The Political Theories, Preconditions and Dangers of the Governing Populism in Hungary”, Czech 
Political Science Review, vol. 24, nº. 1 (2017), pp. 5–20. 
9 See Kaniok, Petr and Havlík, Vlastimil: “Populism and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: Meeting Friends 
or Passing By?”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol. 16, nº. 2 (2016), pp. 20–35. Or Guderjan Marius and 
Wilding, Adrian: “Brexit Populism: The Thick (and Thin) of It”, Czech Political Science Review, vol. 25, nº. 1 
(2018), pp. 64–81. 
10 See Reif, Karlheinz and Schmitt, Hermann: “Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual framework 
for the analysis of European elections results”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 8, nº. 1 (1980), pp. 
3–44. 
11 Hix, Simon and Marsh, Michael: “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections”, The 
Journal of Politics, vol. 69, nº. 2 (2007), pp. 495–510.  
12 Kaniok and Havlík, op. cit. 
13 See Kaniok, Petr: “Free Citizens´ Party – from Brussels to Prague?”, East European Politics, vol. 33, nº. 4 
(2017), pp. 443–449. 
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understand a threat to the people or the nation and the sovereignty of individual states. At the 
same time, political programs are a frequent subject of analysis in the study of populism,14 and 
we can also build upon the tradition of the research of political programs for EP elections – 
these research works often focus on themes that are dealt with in our text, for example anti-
immigration stances.15 
2. Populism and its state in V4 countries 
Populism belongs to the most frequent issues in political science recently. However, there is no 
clear consensus on what the essence of populism is. Various authors present populism as a ‘thin-
centered’ ideology, 16  a style, 17  or a discourse. 18  These attitudes toward populism can be 
combined.19 Since the aim of this text is not to contribute to the relevant conceptual discussion, 
it is sufficient to note that in most cases, the essence of populism lies in creating the manichaeist 
division into ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, claiming the sovereignty of people and 
applying the common will, for example through institutions of direct democracy.20 The content 
of the term ‘people’ is often not clearly explained and serves as a classic empty signifier.21 In 
terms of right-wing populism, the people are identified with the nation; in left-wing populism 
they are linked to class, while centrist populists do not specify the category of the people in 
great detail.22 The next important point of populism is “the others”, the enemies of the people, 
who in the eyes of populists work in favor of the elite (and thus to the detriment of the people). 
Recently, populist othering has been associated mainly with the matter of Islam and 
immigration to Europe, which is related to a phenomenon called new xenophobia23 that is 
clearly directed to Muslims. In other cases, ‘the others’ are not understood in an ethnic sense – 
they simply contain anyone who is not, for different reasons, perceived as the member of ‘the 
people’ (populists’ concept of the people is highly exclusive) – this may include homosexuals, 
non-profit organizations, or in another way defined enemies of the people (e.g. the trans-
national elite). Populism simply needs to define the enemy – the ‘them-and-us’ mentality24 is 
after all one of the key principles of populism. 
These definitions of populism, headed by the attempt to define ‘enemies of the people’, 
manifest themselves also in the region of Central Europe, which is the subject of this paper’s 
interest. One specific element of the region is the presence of populists in government in all 
four examined countries. The form, strength, position and development of populist parties, 
however, differ in individual cases. The degree to which elements of liberal democracy are 
weakened also differs; we can observe this weakening throughout the whole region25 and can 
 
14 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, op. cit., p. 1791. 
15  Krotký, Jan: “When Migration Unites Political Parties: The Securitisation of Migration in Czech Party 
Manifestos”, Czech Journal of Political Science, vol. 26, nº. 3 (2019), pp. 181–199. 
16 Mudde, Cas: “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, vol. 39, nº. 4 (2004), pp. 541–543. 
17 Moffitt, Benjamin and Tormey, Simon: “Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style”, 
Political Studies, vol. 62, nº. 2 (2014): pp. 381–397. 
18 Stravakakis, Yannis and Katsambekis, Giorgies: “Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of 
SYRIZA”, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 19, nº. 2 (2015), pp. 119–142. 
19 Buštíková, Lenka and Guasti, Petra: “The State as a Firm: Understanding the Autocratic Roots of Technocratic 
Populism”, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, vol. 33, nº. 2 (2019), pp. 302–330. 
20 Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, op. cit. 
21 See Laclau, Ernesto (2005): On Populist Reason, London, Verso. 
22 Havlík and Voda, op. cit., p. 165. 
23 See Khair, Tabish (2016): The New Xenophobia, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
24  See Knight, Alan: “Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico”, Journal of Latin 
American Studies, vol. 30, nº. 2 (1998), pp. 223–248. 
25 See Buštíková, Lenka and Guasti, Petra: “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?”, Politics and 
Governance, vol. 5, nº. 4 (2017), pp. 166–176 
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put it into a direct context with the operation of populist parties.26 Liberal democracy, which is 
facing significant regression in the region, is the natural enemy of populism.27 
In the case of Czech Republic, if we dismiss the success of the extreme right in the first 
half of the nineties, the entrance of populist parties is linked to the parliamentary elections of 
2010, which caused an election upset and significantly transformed the traditional structure of 
the party system.28 Thanks to these elections, the Public Affairs party, a centrist populist party, 
made it to the parliament and the government.29 Successes were noted by populists (although 
now in the form of other parties) in elections in 2013 and 201730, and the key sources of their 
success seem to have been anti-corruption and anti-immigration rhetoric. 31  The clearly 
dominant party of the present party system and at the same time strongest government entity is 
the ANO2011 movement (ANO), led by billionaire (and present prime minister) Andrej Babiš, 
which is a “textbook” example of a centrist populist party.32 Despite his dubious business 
activities and problems with corruption, Babiš has managed to gain roughly one third of voters 
primarily thanks to his rhetoric, which deems the established political parties as corrupt.33 The 
second relevant populist party in the Czech system is Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) 
led by Czech-Japanese entrepreneur Tomio Okamura. This opposition party, which bases its 
rhetoric primarily on anti-immigration34  and anti-European positions is a representative of 
right-wing populism. Both of these parties were successful in elections to the EP in 2019. 
Although this article deals with populist parties, it is necessary for the image of the present state 
of populism in the Czech Republic to mention president Miloš Zeman, who is an exemplary 
populist35 and has a link to both aforementioned political parties. 
In the first decade of the independent existence, Slovakia was associated with 
“nationalistic populism” linked to Vladimír Mečiar.36 Strong presence of populism led scholars 
 
26 See Hanley, Seán and Vachudova, Milada Anna: “Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in 
the Czech Republic”, East European Politics, vol. 34, nº. 3 (2018), pp. 276–296 
27 Havlík, Vlastimil: “Technocratic Populism and Political Illiberalism in Central Europe”, Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 66, nº. 6 (2019), pp. 369–384. 
28 See Hanley, Seán: “Dynamics of new party formation in the Czech Republic 1996–2010: looking for the origins 
of a ‘political eartquake’”, East European Politics, vol. 28, nº. 2 (2012), pp. 119–143. 
29 See Havlík, Vlastimil and Hloušek, Vít: “Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: The Story of the Populist Public Affairs Party 
in the Czech Republic”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 15, nº. 4 (2014), pp. 552–570 
30 See Maškarinec, Pavel: “The rise of new populist political parties in Czech parliamentary elections between 
2010 and 2017: the geography of party replacement”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 60, nº. 5 (2019): 
511–547. 
31 We can mention also the success of the Pirate Party in 2017 national elections. The program of this party is 
based on the anti-corrupt and anti-establishment rhetoric. On the other hand, we can’t speak about the party as 
about strictly populist. For more information see Šárovec, Daniel: “Assured Newcomers on a Squally Sea? The 
Czech Pirate Party before and after the 2017 Elections”, Acta Fakulty filozofické Západočeské Univerzity v Plzni, 
vol. 11, nº. 2 (2019), pp. 1–21.  
32 See Havlík and Voda, op. cit. Hanley and Vachudova, op. cit. Bustikova and Guasti, op. cit., etc. 
33 See Naxera, Vladimír: “The Never-ending Story: Czech Governments, Corruption and Populist Anti-Corruption 
Rhetoric (2010–2018)”, Politics in Central Europe, vol. 14, nº. 3 (2018), pp. 31–54. 
34  See Stulík, Ondřej: “Do we have all the necessary data? The challenge of measuring populism through 
metaphors”, Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, vol. 53, nº. 5 (2019), pp. 2653–2670. 
35 See Naxera, Vladimír and Krčál, Petr: ““This is a Controlled Invasion”: The Czech President Miloš Zeman’s 
Populist Perception of Islam and Immigration as Security Threats”, Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language 
Politics, vol. 12, nº. 2 (2018), pp. 192–215; Naxera, Vladimír and Krčál, Petr: ““You can’t corrupt eight million 
voters”: corruption as a topic in Miloš Zeman’s populist strategy”, Studies of Transition States and Societies, Vol. 
11, No. 1 (2019), pp. 3–18; Naxera, Vladimír and Krčál, Petr: “”Ostrovy deviace” v populistické rétorice Miloše 
Zemana,” Soiológia, vol. 52, nº. 1 (2020), pp. 82–99. 
36 Spáč, Peter: “Populism in Slovakia”, in Havlík, Vlastimil and Pinková, Aneta (eds.) (2012): Populist Political 
Parties in East Central Europe, Brno, Munipress, pp. 227–258. 
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as Michael Carpenter to write about a specific “nationalist-populist” culture.37 Mečiar's rule is 
very important for the development of nationalistic populism in Slovak politics still seen today, 
and it has contributed to the integrative shift in Slovakian party politics.38 Grigorij Mesežnikov 
and Oľga Gyárfášová mentioned three original actors who are carriers of the nationalist 
populism. These include Mečiar’s HZDS (The People's Party – Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia), SNS (The Slovak National Party) and Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy). All 
mentioned parties were to various degrees developing aspects of nationalistic populism 
including:  
1) Ethno-national etatism, state paternalism and patriotism – instead of civic principle, 
liberal-democratic elements and multi-culturalism;39  
2) Interpretation of national history involving mythologization and ethnicity emphasizing 
interpretation;  
3) Cautious or negative relationship to national minorities and its rights, especially in 
relation to Hungarian and Roma minority,  
4) Hungarians´attitude regarding Hungary as a “motherland” in relation to the issue of 
reconciliation.40  
Some of the aspects are still present in the Slovak politics and other emerged or slightly 
changed. Contemporary wave of populism has been strengthened by the “migration crisis” of 
2015/2016 which helped to create the new “them”. The traditional threat of Hungarian minority 
become accommodated by the moderate Hungarian representation in the parliament where 
Most-Híd (The Bridge) entered into coalition with SNP, which blunted mutual animosities. The 
migration crisis shifted the attention from the Roman minority to Muslim immigrants and 
contributed to the rise of far-right extremism as a reaction to liberalism and threat of 
multiculturalism with the aim to defend traditional conservative values. Probably the most 
visible populist opposition towards the contemporary elites is presented by the neofascist anti-
system party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS; Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše 
Slovensko) which entered the Slovakian Parliament after 2016.41 Another party, which may be 
labelled as populist is OBYČAJNÍ ĽUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti (OĽaNO; ORDINARY 
PEOPLE and independent personalities) which has been present in the parliament since 2012 
under the leadership of Igor Matovič.42 Next to the Smer, Kotleba-ĽSNS and OĽaNO, populism 
is associated also with SME RODINA – Boris Kollár (WE ARE FAMILY – Boris Kollár) 
which entered parliament in 2016. The situation after the 2016 general election was that out of 
150 seats in parliament in total, 93 were related to parties associated to populism. Nonetheless, 
it is obvious that the nature of populism in Slovakia changed in contrast to 1990s nationalist 
populism and has incorporated new elements. Despite previous attempts of analysis43, there is 
 
37 Carpenter, Michael: “Slovakia and the triumph of nationalist populism”, Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, vol. 30, nº. 2 (1997), pp. 205–219.  
38 Bardovič, Jakub: “Politické strany – pragmatický aktér v procese tvorby politiky?”, Slovak Journal of Public 
Policy and Public Administration, vol. 3, nº. 2 (2016), p. 106. 
39 See also Deegan-Krause, Kevin: “Populism, democracy, andnationalism in Slovakia”, in Mudde, Cas and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, Cristóbal (eds.) (2012): Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? 
New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–204. 
40  Mesežnikov, Grigorij and Gyárfášová, Oľga (2008): Národný populizmus na Slovensku. Pracovné zošity, 
Bratislava, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, p. 12.  
41 Walter, Aaron T.: “The Politics of Hate: Islamophobic populism in Slovak media and political discourse”, 
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti (Religious-Philosophical Articles), vol. 24 (2018), pp. 43. 
42 Just several days after publication of candidate lists Igor Matovič resigned on the possible future mandate. As a 
result, Peter Pollák, first Slovak member of the European Parliament with Roma nationality, was elected.  
43 Deegan-Krause, Kevin and Haughton, Tim: “Towards a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and 
Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia”, Politics & Policy, vol. 37, nº. 4 (2009), pp. 821–841; Rybář, 
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no consensus about which contemporary Slovak parties are populist, as populism in Slovakia 
becomes a pejorative label with an increasingly shallow meaning.44  
Poland, like other European countries, has experienced the emergence of populist 
political parties on the political scene. Initially, they were groups that took advantage of 
society’s exhaustion and disappointment by the sacrifices of the transformation period.45 In the 
first years of the new century, they celebrated their triumphs, getting into parliament for the 
first time in 2001 and in the following years by participating in the government coalition (since 
2006). These include, first and foremost, extreme-left Self-Defense (Samoobrona 
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SO, Self-Defense) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich 
Rodzin, LPR) representing right-wing populism. The founder and leader of Self-Defense was 
a farmer and trade unionist, Andrzej Lepper. These were the parties that were built from scratch, 
not associated with any grouping from the past. In 2005, four years after the emergence of the 
new groups on the political scene in Poland – like the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) and the 
liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), the political scene was dominated by a new social 
division between the choices of a “socio-solidarist” or “liberal” vision of Poland.46 It replaced 
the dominant dichotomy of political divisions into post-communists and post-solidarity. At that 
time, PiS moved sharply towards the populist rhetoric of repairing the state, restoring proper 
order, tracking down and eliminating corrupt practices, and opposing the current elite, which 
revived in the slogans of this grouping after losing power in 2007. This aspect of populist 
discourse, in particular anti-elitism, had its roots in Poland after 1918, before the World War II. 
47 It was a division into “them” – ruling, decisive, law-making- and “us” – subordinate and 
injured by “them”. Self-Defense stressed that it speaks on behalf of all people,48 its goal is to 
defend ordinary, honest and entrepreneurial citizens, deprived of prospects by the economic 
system,49 and did not abandon this rhetoric, even after entering parliament.50 It was referred to 
in 2015 by the new political force – the anti-establishment association Kukiz'15,51 whose leader 
and founder is Paweł Kukiz, singer and leader of a Polish rock band. What united both the 
 
Marek: “Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia”, in Jungerstam-Mulders, Susanne 
(ed.) (2006): Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot, UK, Ashgate, pp. 147–
176; Or Rupnik, Jacques: “From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, nº. 4 
(2007), pp. 17–25. 
44  Mihálik, Jaroslav: “Politický extrémizmus: kontext, koncepcie a jeho vymedzenie v Českej a Slovenskej 
republike”, in Mihálik, Jaroslav (ed.) (2019): Storočie českej a slovenskej krajnej pravice 1918–2018, Bratislava, 
IRIS. 
45 Antoszewski, Andrzej (2009): Parties and Party Systems in the EU Member States at the Turn of the 20th and 
21st Centuries, Toruń, Adam Marszałek, pp. 256–257. 
46  See Szczerbiak, Alex: “‘Social Poland’ Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’? The September–October 2005 Polish 
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 23, nº. 2 
(2007), pp. 203–223; Markowski, Radosław: “The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of 
Party System”, West European Politics, vol. 29 (2006), pp. 814–832.  
47 Stanley, Ben and Mikołaj Cześnik: “Populism in Poland,” in Stockemer, Saniel (ed.) (2019): Populism around 
the World. A Comparative Perspective, New York, Springer International Publishing, p. 68.  
48  Stępińska, Agnieszka; Lipiński, Artur; Hess, Agnieszka and Piątek, Dorota: “Poland. A Fourth Wave of 
Populism?” in Aalberg, Toril; Esser, Frank; Reinemann, Carsten; Stromback, Jesper and De Vreese, Claes H. 
(eds.) (2017): Populistic Political Communication in Europe, New York and Abingdon, Routledge.  
49See Kucharczyk, Jacek and Wysocka, Olga: “Poland”, in Masaznikov G.; Gyarfasova O. and Smolov D. (eds.) 
(2008): Populist politics and liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava, Institute for Public 
Affairs, pp. 69–88. See also: van Kessel, Stijn (2005): Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 121–143. 
50 See Jasiewicz, Krzysztof: “The New Populism in Poland: The Usual Suspects?”, Problems of Post-Communism, 
vol. 55, nº. 3 (2008), pp. 7–25. 
51 See Kosowska-Gąstoł, Beata and Sobolewska-Myślik, Katarzyna: “New parties in the Polish party system 2011–
2018: The Palikot Movement, Kukiz’15 and the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru as genuinely new parties?”, 
Central European Journal of Politics, vol. 5, nº. 1 (2019), pp. 6–29. 
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longtime leader of Self-Defense and Paweł Kukiz was the rhetoric of breaking with the current 
corrupt political elites and cutting off from the political elite detached from citizens for the 
benefit of real representatives of society. Kukiz'15 emphasizes the detachment of politicians 
from reality. The solution and remedy to these problems would be, according to him, the 
introduction of the universal direct decision-making of citizens in many laws by means of 
referendums, a clear responsibility of politicians elected by majority in single-member 
constituencies. The new grouping focused very much on media presence, from the very 
beginning attached less importance to organizational structures, what is quite typical for 
Western European populist parties.52 It seems that after three waves of populism53 we are facing 
in Poland a fourth wave of this phenomenon.54 With that in mind, it is very likely the populist 
slogans in the Polish politics will be revived in the coming years. 
Similar phenomena can be seen in Hungary as well. After a protracting political, moral 
and economic crisis, the national conservative Alliance of Young Democrats and Christian 
Democrats (Fidesz-KDNP) won a landslide victory in the 2010 elections and began to 
systematically rearrange the country.55 The former leading power, the Socialist-Liberal alliance 
in the midst of the vicious circle of corruption scandals and failed development projects was 
unable to provide a real political alternative. The bipolar party system based on bipartisan logic 
has disrupted, the left-wing bloc has crumbled and the government started to transform 
economic and social subsystems without opposition. 56  Due to the rapid, in many cases 
inconsiderate reforms and unfavorable decisions affecting many workers’ future in different 
sectors resulted in a general disappointment in right-wing coalition, but these people did not 
have real alternative political options. The elections in 2014 were again won with a two-third 
majority by Fidesz-KDNP, but by fall the extremely populist governmental communication 
“got tired”, the coalition's popularity had decreased and in parallel the far-right, radical 
Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) has risen. This party used a very populist rhetoric also 
focusing on corruption and punishment mostly.57  Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, after the 
proclamation of the National Cooperation System for the pragmatic governance and national 
issues in 2010, and the announcement of the idea of the illiberal democracy in 2014 he found 
the topic that dominates the public discourse in Hungary since then. This communication which 
focuses on uncontrolled migration, illegal migrants and the NGOs that help them, brought a 
victory to Fidesz-KDNP in 2018 as well. Orbán’s statement consists of everything what they 
wanted to say about this new direction: “We want to keep Hungary as Hungary”. 
In these paragraphs we can see the real state and power of populist actors in the Central 
European region. The fact that significant differences can be found (i.e. power of parties, their 
position on right-left axis, development of principles of populism in individual counties, etc.) 
notwithstanding, there is one fundamental similarity – in the time of writing of this paper, 
 
52  Poguntke, Thomas: “Party Organizational Linkage: Parties Without Firm Social Roots?”, in Luther, Kurt 
Richard and Mueller-Rommel, Ferdinand (eds.) (2005): Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and 
Analytical Challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 58–62. 
53 See Przyłęcki, Paweł (2012): Populizm w polskej polityce. Analiza dyskursu polityki [Populism in Polish 
politics. Analysis of policy discourse], Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 
54 See Stępińska, Lipiński, Hess and Piątek, op. cit. 
55 See Kovacs, Zoltan and Vida, György: “Geography of the new electoral system and changing voting patterns in 
Hungary”, Acta Geobalcanica, vol. 1, nº. 2 (2015), pp. 55–64. 
56 See Glied, Viktor: “From the Green movement to a party”, Politeja, vol. 2, nº. 28 (2014), pp. 31–61. 
57 See Mareš, Miroslav and Havlík, Vratislav: “Jobbik's successes. An analysis of its success in the comparative 
context of the V4 countries”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 49, nº. 4 (2016), pp. 1–35. 
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populist parties are a key element of governments (Czech Republic, Slovakia) or are able to 
rule with no coalition partners (Hungary,58 Poland) in each country in the region. 
3. The 2019 EP elections – An analysis of manifestos 
3.1. Data and methodology 
In the following sections, we will present the topics that populist parties have framed in their 
programs for the EP 2019 elections as a problem or risk in the sense of evoking moral panic59 
or securitization60; we do not, however, differentiate analytically between them. The paper is 
conceived as a qualitative content analysis, and the data corpuses are made up of the official 
election programs of relevant populist parties and other sources of communication of these 
political subjects (any exceptions will be mentioned in the individual chapters). Each code 
corresponds to one problem or risk (e.g. migration, EU, etc.). For each code identified in such 
a manner, we present a structure of sub-codes contained in the programs of individual parties. 
The aim is to point out that although parties often label a phenomenon as a threat, the individual 
sub-codes that form the logic of their argumentation and are linked e.g. to causes, 
manifestations, consequences of a given problem or its solution differ significantly. Individual 
entities will be illustrated using representative statements from their election programs. The 
statements and direct quotes that we have listed in the text do not capture the uniqueness of 
their occurrence, but represent the overall logic of portraying problems in the programs. If not 
stated otherwise, all verbatim quotes have been taken from the programs of a given party. The 
conclusion of each section succinctly summarizes the difference or similarity of the 
argumentation (i.e. the structure of codes and sub-codes identified in programs) of individual 
parties.  
3.2. Czech Republic 
The 2019 EP elections took place in the Czech Republic at a time of minority government rule 
by Babiš’s ANO movement and the social democrats, supported by the communists. The ANO 
movement won in the EP elections with more than 21% of votes (it gained six of the total of 21 
mandates61), which is, however, 10% less than the voter preference that has long been attributed 
to the party. The second party that is the subject of interest in this text is the right-wing populist 
SPD, which gained over 9% (in this case as well it is a smaller gain than the long-term 
preferences for the party), which made up two mandates. As we will point out below, both 
parties primarily defined the European Union and migration (which has become the number 
one political topic in the Czech Republic despite no realistic presence of migrants) as problems 
for the Czech Republic within their programs.62 
As was already stated, despite the fact that ANO and SPD clearly correspond to the 
definition of populism (primarily in regard to their appeal to the “good people” and their 
negative stance against the “bad elite”), we find significant differences among parties both in 
their programs and positions in the party system, as well as the parties’ internal operation. ANO 
 
58 Basically Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) is the dominant driving power in this pseudo coalition. As a 
member of the Fidesz Association the Christian Democrats (KDNP) passed an agreement with Fidesz on the launch 
of a joint list for the 2006 elections. Since 2006 these parties have been operating in symbiosis.  
59 Cohen, Stanley (2011): Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, Oxon, Routledge. 
60 Balzacq, Thierry: “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, European 
Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, nº. 2 (2005), pp. 171–201. 
61  2019 European elections results, at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-
results/czechia/2019-2024/.  
62 Naxera, Vladimír: ““Islamophobia without Muslims”: Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab Attitudes in Czech Society 
(Introductory Remarks),” in Gardocki, Sylwester; Ożarowski, Rafał and Ulatowski, Rafał (eds.) (2019): The 
Islamic World in International Relations, Berlin, Peter Lang, pp. 251–267. 
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is a typical representative of a centrist populist party;63 at the same time it is a typical example 
of a business-firm party64 with Babiš in an unshakable position at its head.65 The party was 
created based on the operation of Agrofert holding in order to link political and economic 
interests (primarily the flow of state and European grants) in favor of its chairman Babiš, who 
in his own words intends to manage the state (and party) as he would a company. ANO was 
created shortly before the 2013 elections, after which it became a part of the coalition 
government led by the social democrats. Successful government engagement and a 
sophisticated PR scheme led ANO to victory in the 2017 elections, after which Babiš became 
prime minister. ANO’s politics show various tendencies towards limiting liberal democratic 
procedures typical for populist parties.66 ANO’s centrality, which stems from the absence of a 
host ideology that is often nationalism or socialism in other cases,67 manifests itself in the 
method in which it understands the category of the people – it does not address a specific social 
group that is defined socially (on the contrary, it repeatedly claims – “we have a program for 
everyone”) or (as in the case of right-wing populists in the Czech Republic or Europe) in an 
ethnic sense. This, by the way, is not highly feasible, as Babiš himself is ethnically Slovak, not 
Czech. The “common people” towards whom ANO directs its populist rhetoric are those that 
“live and work honestly in the Czech Republic” without pointing to a specific class or ethnic 
Czechs (as ANO writes in its program for the EP elections: “We must do everything we can for 
our citizens to protect what we have and what we’ve achieved together. We must do everything 
possible for our people to make full use of their potential and creativity.”). On the other hand, 
ANO is a proponent of economic nationalism68 and in its rhetoric often deals with economic 
protectionism towards Czech companies (many of which Babiš himself owns). This 
protectionism has been linked to the fact that the EU does not plan to pay out subsidies to 
companies owned by Babiš, who is – in the words of the European Commission – in a conflict 
of interest (as the prime minister and owner of companies collecting subsidies). Babiš has 
framed this strategy by the EU not as its attempt to enforce the law, but as an effort of the 
supranational elite to harm Czech entrepreneurship. Here his argumentation is exemplary in its 
populism, although we observe it only from the second half of 2019 in such an extreme form, 
i.e. several months after the completion of elections to the European Parliament. In addition to 
the economic protectionism, the party’s rhetoric points to immigration as a problem, although 
in a qualitatively and quantitatively different manner than SPD.  
SPD is a party that is significantly different and is a typical representative of right-wing 
populism, making it similar to a score of Western European parties69 with which it cooperates 
– Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen were depicted on SPD’s billboards before EP elections 
together with Tomio Okamura, the party’s leader. Okamura (identically to Babiš) is a typical 
political entrepreneur70, although his rhetoric differs from the rhetoric of ANO. He frames the 
people in an ethnic sense and his primary enemies are variously defined groups of “the others”, 
who tend to be vaguely defined, primarily as Muslims or immigrants. In addition to his Czech 
roots, Okamura himself is also of Korean and Japanese origin; however, he always emphasizes 
 
63 See Havlík and Voda, op. cit. Hanley and Vachudova, op. cit. Bustikova and Guasti, op. cit., etc. 
64 Kopeček, Lubomír: ““I’m Paying, So I Decide”: Czech ANO as an Extreme Form of a Business-Firm Party”, 
European Politics and Societies and Cultures, vol. 30, nº. 4 (2016), pp. 725–749. 
65 Kubát, Michal and Hartliński, Maciej: “Party leaders in the Czech Populist Parties and Movements”, Polish 
Political Science Review, vol. 7, nº. 1 (2019), pp. 107–119. 
66 Hanley and Vachudova, op. cit., p. 275. 
67 Havlík and Voda, op. cit., p. 175. 
68 Hanley and Vachudova, op. cit., p. 281. 
69 See Mudde, Cas (2007): Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
70 Svačinová, Petra: “Poučení z chyb Úsvitu: Svoboda a přímá demokracie,” in Hloušek, Vít; Chytilek, Roman; 
Kopeček, Lubomír and Svačinová, Petra (2018): Já platím, já rozhoduji! Političtí podnikatelé a jejich strany, Brno, 
Barrister&Principal, pp. 177–218. 
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his Czech roots and rhetorically attacks not all foreigners, but those whom he associates with 
Islam – realistically this includes all incoming foreigners in the “migration crisis” that has been 
taking place for several years (without concern for whether they are Muslims or not). This influx 
of members of a different culture is understood as a process controlled by the supranational 
elite, the goal of which is the “Islamization of Europe”.  
SPD and ANO’s programs for the 2019 EP elections are in many specific areas similar 
(for example, the parties agree on refusing the Euro or the need to limit the sale of foodstuffs 
of varying quality in various European countries) and concur in two primary problems – 
migration and the present operation of the European Union. However, the overall wording of 
their programs and their offered solutions are different, not only in the ANO program’s larger 
thematic spectrum and its generally more moderate tone, but primarily in the framing of the 
aforementioned problems that the Czech Republic faces. 
First, we will begin with the view of the European Union. ANO does not see the EU as 
a problem as such, but rather its present method of operation – the EU must thus be transformed: 
“It is clear that the European Union is an excellent project. It has brought peace, security and 
prosperity to our continent. We want to be and will be a part of it – there is no doubt about that. 
But as you have surely noticed recently, the Union is sometimes short-winded and the European 
Commission sometimes behaves incomprehensibly and illogically. Yes, some things that come 
from the EU lack common sense. Yes, they are things that are not correct or favorable for us.” 
The EU should be less bureaucratic and regulative and should focus on the operation of a unified 
market and allow individual states to enforce greater influence on the operation of the Union.  
SPD’s view has been diametrically different from the very beginning of their program: 
“The European Union cannot be reformed and must end. We support the end of the European 
Union […] We are running in these elections to stop the dictation of the neo-Marxist globalists 
controlling the present European Union. We’re not alone! In cooperation with strong patriotic 
allies from our European parliamentary fraction Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) headed 
by Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini and Geert Wilders, we are prepared to build a new form of 
cooperation among Europe’s nation states. A cooperation which will respect and protect our 
sovereignty, freedom, culture and traditional social values. We will shake up Brussels. If you 
don’t want to be ruled by people like Juncker, Macron, Merkel or Soros, please vote for SPD!” 
In SPD’s case, nationalism clearly serves as a host ideology for populism. The introductory 
statement from the program is exemplary in its populism – the Czech people are endangered by 
the transnational elite. As the program goes on to state, the EU stands on the principle of “non-
democratic rule of unelected dictators in Brussels.” The general will should then decide 
whether or not to remain under this rule via direct democracy: “We are protecting the clear right 
of citizens to a referendum on exiting the European Union.” The EU is a problem for a number 
of reasons; nonetheless, the extreme-right basis of SPD’s argumentation is evident: “The 
European Union has let millions of inadaptable immigrants into Europe who murder, rape, steal 
and commit terrorist attacks. And so citizens are not able to defend themselves, they want to 
take away their weapons for personal protection. Not only firearms, but even certain types of 
knives.” Or: “The European Union uses our money to subsidize many non-profit organizations 
that support the ideology of neo-Marxism, gender and multiculturalism.” 
Both parties corresponded in their mention of immigration as a significant problem. In 
this regard, however, ANO’s program is significantly more moderate. It sees illegal 
immigration as a fundamental security problem (puts it into the context of terrorist attacks in 
Europe). It is necessary to provide security, but ANO also warns against the evocation of 
xenophobic sentiment. The problem of migration should be dealt with together on an EU level 
– protection of external borders, cooperation of the security forces of individual states and an 
active approach from which immigrants are arriving. However, the party does not support the 
Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 54 (October/Octubre 2020)  
81 
 
distribution of refugees within the EU: “Thanks to us, compulsory quotas were refused in June 
2018, and things will stay that way. We also insist that national bodies make decisions on legal 
economic migration, for example in connection with the needs of the national economy.” 
SPD accepts a wholly different rhetoric and problem-solving methods: “In its official 
documents, the European Union talks of the necessity to support mass immigration and sees 
immigration to be a positive phenomenon. It is thus no surprise that millions of illegal 
immigrants have entered Europe. We clearly say no to quotas on immigrants, no to the shared 
EU immigration policy, and no to mass immigration. […] The large cities of Western Europe 
have already been Islamized and Islamic ghettos and no-go zones are popping up everywhere 
there. We cannot let this happen in our country! Patriotism and the traditional values of our 
civilization are taboos for the EU. Together with European patriots we will defend ourselves 
against Islamization. […] Western Europe will continue to be Islamized. If the states of Western 
Europe cannot be saved and they would be Muslim, we must at least protect the area of Central 
Europe! This cooperation is also a barrier against the hegemony of Germany, France and other 
superpowers.” Contrary to ANO, it is clear from SPD’s argumentation that there is not only a 
physical threat, but also a threat to identity71 – immigration controlled by the European Union 
destroys our culture and traditions, as culturally different newcomers cannot be assimilated. 
This is a typical manifestation of the nativist extreme right.72 Thus, dealing with migration does 
not lie in European cooperation but in the activity of nation states or “natural alliances” of V4 
countries, which according to SPD share values and also take an active part in the fight against 
Islamic terrorism.73 
Both representatives of these populist parties in the Czech Republic cite problems with 
the EU and migration as their primary topics, albeit each in a fundamentally different way. The 
structure of both parties’ argumentation is shown in the table below. The method in which SPD 
deals with migration and the EU in its program is thus a good example of right-wing populism. 
On the other hand, elements of populism (in the sense of evident people-centrism and anti-
elitism) are not explicitly evident in ANO’s program; however, there is no doubt that ANO is 
an exemplary populist party.74 This fact is evident after taking a brief look at the social networks 
of the party and party leader Babiš’s speeches. The absence of populist rhetoric within the 
election program thus points to the possible limitations of research due to limited data on the 
election program. However, knowledge that populist rhetoric is subdued in the program is in 
itself analytically relevant and can be explained by the effort to target mainstream voters.  




Sub-codes (structure of party argumentation) 
SPD EU 
Cannot be reformed 
Threatens the people 
Transnational unelected elite 
Supports migration 
 
71 Czajka, Agnes: “Migration in the Age of Nation-State: Migrants, Refugees, and the National Order of Things”, 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 39, nº. 3 (2014), pp. 151–163. 
72 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, op. cit. 
73 N. Hlaváčková, Hana: “The fight against terrorism is not optional: cases of V4 states and their participation in 
the fight against IS”, Politics in Central Europe, vol. 15, nº. 2 (2019): pp. 309–331. Or N. Hlaváčková, Hana: “EU 
Small States and Their Fight against IS”, in in Gardocki, Sylwester; Ożarowski, Rafał and Ulatowski, Rafał (eds.) 
(2019): The Islamic World in International Relations, Berlin, Peter Lang, pp. 129–141. 
74 See Havlík and Voda, op. cit. Hanley and Vachudova, op. cit. Bustikova and Guasti, op. cit., etc. 
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Allows for a hegemony of superpowers 
Ideological evil (“neo-Marxism”) 
Migration 
Physical threat (terrorism) 
Cultural threat  
Supported by the EU 
Solution on the level of nation states  
ANO 
EU 
Must be reformed 
Economic protectionism (support of Czech companies 
in the EU) 
Migration 
Physical threat (terrorism) 
Solution on the EU level  
Economic protectionism (controlled work migration 
in favor of individual states) 
 
3.3. Slovakia 
The 2019 Elections to the European Parliament in Slovakia took place at the turbulent times. 
While immigration crisis was slowly leaving medial space, citizens were closely watching 
investigation of Ján Kuciak murder – the assassination of the journalist who wrote about links 
between the state and the mafia. This affair was damaging mainly Smer-SD which was for about 
10 years in the government and thus perceived as responsible for the situation in the country. 
Moreover, elections to the National Council in 2016 contributed to legitimization of the neo-
fascist Kotleba-ĽSNS which enjoyed increasing popularity with the aim to win 2020 elections. 
For this reason, elections to the European Parliament in 2019 had only limited importance and 
served as a litmus test of Slovakian politics. In total, seven political parties in Slovakia 
succeeded (two were in electoral coalition). Next to the coalition of Progressive Slovakia and 
Spolu (Together) with 20.11 % of popular vote and 4 seats was Smer-SD with 3 seats (15.72 % 
of votes), Kotleba-ĽSNS with 2 seats (12.07 % of votes), the Christian Democratic Movement 
(KDH) with 2 seats (9.69 % of votes), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) with 2 seats (9.62 % of 
votes) and OĽaNO with one seat and 5.25 % of popular vote. Out of the seven successful parties 
three of them are associated with populism: Smer, ĽSNS and OĽaNO. In total, 6 out of the 13 
Slovakian seats in the European Parliament belong to parties associated with populist politics.75 
To define populism in the case of Slovakia is increasingly problematic issue. Instead of 
being associated with programmatic topics, populism is merely associated with wry 
communication style emphasizing attacking and acerbic statements or comments appreciated 
by tabloid media. Another issue is its association with the “pandering politics” towards older 
voters who are significant proportion of the electorate. A good example of such attitude is the 
“social packages” of the Smer government aimed at seniors (free lunches, free train 
transportation etc.). In this sense Smer-SD has a similar strategy to win the votes of seniors as 
other populist parties or movements do (e. g. the ANO Movement in the Czech Republic or 
HZDS during the rule of Mečiar). As a result, Smer-SD is having relatively stable core of older 
voters who helps to keep the party in politics. The party may be considered well established in 
 
75  Results by national party: 2019-2024, at https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-
results/slovakia/2019-2024/.  
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the Slovakian politics and in the last decade has ruled the country. This has several implications 
for populism. First, party members are as the “elite” and are part of the establishment. For this 
reason, party anti-establishment rhetoric (typical for populism) is slightly changed. It is a 
paradox that for example for 2020 elections party changed its image to “new Smer” and is 
declaring that “only Smer can bring real change into politics”. Second, from the program 
perspective party is depleted. Probably, this is the reason why party did not adopt special 
program for the elections into the European parliament and for 2020 elections to National 
Council has set up only three program points. Party leaders, including Robert Fico often reacted 
on actual developments rather than created long term vision. Ruling without a formal program 
has given them advantage for maneuvering and gives the party advantage of communicating 
most important points. Third, party leaders took the role of protectors. Under the notion “We 
protect Slovakia” refused EU migration quotas and strongly criticized threat of migration.76  
The party Kotleba-ĽSNS may be labelled as neo-fascist, extremist, anti-system party 
with the specific view on modern political history of Slovakia.77 The program of the party is 
both politically and economically radical. For example ĽSNS is in favor of “restoring 
agricultural, economic and energetic self-sufficiency of the Slovak Republic”.78 However, there 
are other EU related implications of the program as one of the features is economic radicalism 
with negative implications for the common market.79 This implies the exit from the EU because 
restoring economic self-sufficiency would require imposing protective measures which are 
inconsistent with a common market. However, much more serious seems to be the party links 
to Nazism and Slovak fascism, or the open racism in the program as the party wants “to build 
social policy on a principle of quality and stop preferential treatment of all social parasites, 
including gypsy parasites”.80 Results of the 2016 elections to the National Council, where 
ĽSNS received 8.04 % of votes and 14 mandates, contributed to hot debate about rise of 
extremism in the country and failure to historical reflection. In April 2019 Supreme Court of 
Slovakia decided not to ban the party, what was immediately used by ĽSNS to miscommunicate 
that Court did not find party extremist or radical.81  
The third assessed part in Slovakia associated with populism is OĽaNO. The party was 
created by successful candidates after the 2010 elections to the National Council. The party 
presents itself as the anti-establishment82 alternative of experts with conservative thinking and 
Christian-democratic values. OĽaNO having a role of platform formed of independent people 
gathered around party president Igor Matovič – a former businessman in media. Despite being 
considered as centrist-right, party is very weakly linked to some specific ideology or values. 
Due to providing space for variety of people party program and campaign is being hardly 
predictable and may change from election to election. The character of the party is simply 
imprinted by the personalities. Moreover, it is even hard to evaluate party trend in populism 
whether is increasing or not. Recent activities show that party is very original and tries to 
 
76 Práznovská, Monika: “Media, election campaign and migration crisis”, in Kusá, Alena; Zaušková, Anna and 
Bučková, Zuzana (eds.) (2019): Offline is the new online. Marketing Identity 2019, Trnava, Faculty of Mass Media 
Communication, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, pp. 267–281.  
77 Naxera, Vladimír and Krčál, Petr: “The Slovak National Uprising as a national treasure? Interpretation and 
legacy of the SNU in Slovak political discourse and national mythology”, Annual of Language & Politics and 
Politics of Identity, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2016), pp. 83–102.  
78 ĽSNS: Our program - Ten Commandments of our Party, at http://www.naseslovensko.net/en/our-program/.  
79 Filipec, Ondřej: “People’s Party – Our Slovakia: An Anti-system Party?”, in Horváth, Peter (ed.) (2017): Current 
Trends and Public Administration, Uherské Hradiště, FSV UCM, pp. 21–30. 
80 Ibid. 
81  See for example: Noviny Ľudovej strany Naše Slovensko, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 2019), at 
http://www.naseslovensko.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/noviny-lsns-2019-05.pdf.  
82 Gyárfášová, Oľga: “The fourth generation: from anti-establishment to anti-system parties in Slovakia”, New 
Perspectives, vol. 26, nº. 1 (2018), pp. 109–133. 
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promote populism on a different level. A good example is the on-line survey where people may 
vote about party priorities.83 It might be well expected that the party will later promote these 
points and present the as the will of the people.  
All three Slovak parties are very different in the form and extent of the programs. Instead 
of a formal program, Smer-SD prepared a two-page long propositions for its members entitled 
“Na čo sa chceme v Európe sústrediť” (On what we want to focus in Europe) about three 
priorities Smer wants to communicate in the European Parliament. From a retrospective 
analysis we know, that some local organizational units of Smer communicated these 
propositions on social networks. Despite ĽSNS's claimed that they will publish official program 
for the 2019 elections, to the knowledge of authors it was not done and same conclusion is 
reached also by Zuzana Gabrižová, Radovan Geist and Marián Koreň.84 Most complex program 
with official form was prepared by OĽaNO. The party presented a well-prepared complex 
program entitled “Slovensko v prosperujúcej a bezpečnej Európe” (Slovakia in a prosperous 
and safe Europe) with eight priorities. It is possible, that the program to the EP was created or 
advised by some of the OĽaNO's members in the European parliament.85 What all three parties 
have in common is some reflection of migration and the attitude towards the EU. The tone is 
ranging from moderate criticism (OĽaNO) to more critical tone highlighting social issues 
(Smer-SD) and to open hostility towards the EU later calmed down by cold pragmatism of some 
leaders (ĽSNS'). 
Similarly, as in the previous part dedicated to the Czech Republic first issue is overall 
attitude towards the EU. However, in the case of Smer-SD the attitude is mentioned in the 
propositions only indirectly. Party only mentioned the priority to fight for social equality in 
Europe: equal rewarding of men and women for same job and party stressed also, that “Slovaks 
shall not be cheap working force abroad”.86 Smer-SD promised that it will connect instead of 
dividing: Slovakia wants to be a “bridge” between West and East. At the same time Russia is 
mentioned as an important partner, not a threat. Under this point it is also mentioned that 
members of the EP are ready to renew the dialogue between East and West. 87 In other words, 
some complex vision on Europe is missing and might be derived from the up-to-date approach. 
As mentioned before, Smer-SD ruled Slovakia for the last 10 years. It is a time long enough to 
adopt constructive policy with pragmatic approach as demonstrated during the Slovak 
presidency where government did as much as possible to get rid of quotas or during debates on 
the future of Europe, during which Robert Fico claimed that Slovakia wants to be at the core of 
the EU.88  
In its original program of 2016, Kotleba ĽSNS had appealed to leaving the EU: using 
the motto “with courage against the system” ĽSNS was strongly critical towards the EU. In one 
of the “ten commandments” of the party dedicated to the EU, ĽSNS stressed: “We put Slovak 
interests above the dictats of Brussels and therefore we refuse to restrict the sovereignty of 
member states of the European Union. We will never support any form of state aid to 
irresponsible private banks or foreign governments. We will strengthen the control of illegal 
 
83 Survey is available here: https://rozhodni.obycajniludia.sk/ 
84 Gabrižová, Zuzana; Geist, Radovan and Koreň, Marián (2019): Slovensko a Eurovolby 2019. EÚ v programech 
a pozíciách slovenských politických strán před volbami do Európského parlamentu, Bratislava, Euractiv, p. 7–8. 
85 For this point we are thankful to political scientist Dr. Marek Hrušovský. 




88 Měšťánková, Petra and Filipec, Ondřej: “Debates on the Future of the EU: Between Expectations and Reality”, 
in Šišková, Naděžda (ed.) (2019): The European Union – What is Next? A Legal Analysis and the Political Visions 
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employment of foreigners, immigration and visa policy. We will re-establish the Slovak 
national currency – Slovak crown.” 89  Strong criticism is present also in the pre-electoral 
magazine for the elections to the European parliament. Brussels and its elites are presented as 
hostile towards Europe and Slovakia in particular (dictats, forced migration, destruction of 
traditional families, promotion of LGBT rights and homosexuality, is a source of decadency, 
political censorship etc.). According to ĽSNS, European integration changed to a purely 
political project where EU is deciding how much of what we (Slovakia) can produce and what 
economic rules to respect. 90 However, before the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 
there is a qualitative shift: ĽSNS does not anymore push for exit from the EU, but for a 
comprehensive EU reform. The party is expecting to work with other critical parties with the 
aim to create “Europe of free nations” based on unanimous voting. This attitude presented by 
some party leaders is in sharp contrast with strong rhetoric against the EU. For example, Milan 
Uhrík, who jumped from the 14th place of the candidate list to the top due to preferential votes, 
said: “…we are not against the idea of the European Union as a such. Media informed about 
the opposite for the purpose, they made scarecrow of us. We are not against mutual economic 
cooperation, on the opposite. If Slovakia and the EU want to compete with superpowers as 
USA, China or Japan, then there must be some economic cooperation.”91 This statement is not 
fully compatible with the above mentioned reservations based on neither misinterpretations nor 
the conduct of the party which in 2017 attempted to initiate a referendum on the exit from the 
EU and openly called for leaving. Nonetheless, based on ĽSNS's communication it is visible 
that Uhrík in the European Parliament profiled himself by criticizing migration policy and the 
aggressive foreign policy of the USA.92 Certainly, ĽSNS' is in favor of Europe becoming 
friendlier to Russia, and some members put good relations with Russia on a billboard as the 
priority. For example, on billboards of Milan Mazurek or Jozef Mihalčin, there was a slogan 
“For cooperation with Russia, against sanctions”. Moreover, LSNS is for anti-liberal Europe 
where “schools are supported by the EU to promote gender ideology” or “encourage Slovak 
children to dress as the opposite sex and participate on the rainbow marches”.93  
OĽaNO is at the EU level part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group. In 
its program for the European parliament entitled “Slovakia and the prosperous and secure 
Europe” OĽaNO claimed to be a “Eurorealist” party. EU is seen as the “guarantee for survival 
and development of Slovakia in the globalized world” which implies positive attitude towards 
the EU. As mentioned in the program OĽaNO is against both extremes: leaving the EU or 
deeper and more genuine integration. In many aspects OĽaNO is trying to maintain or slightly 
improve the status quo. As noted in the analysis by Euractiv, there is visible shift from critical 
and Eurosceptic rhetoric present before the 2014 elections to the European parliament.94 
Moreover, the call for more direct democracy and call for direct elections of the “European 
president” disappeared which implies softening of populist elements. There are several 
priorities presented by the party. In relation to the EU as such party is in favor of fight against 
bureaucracy and even enhancing cooperation where proven necessary.95  
The topic of migration in the propositions sent by SMER to its members might be linked 
to the last of three priorities dealt with. It is mentioned that “Europe shall not forget about its 
 
89 ĽSNS: Our program, op. cit. 
90 Noviny Ľudovej strany Naše Slovensko, op. cit. 
91 TA3: “Noví slovenskí poslanci v Európskom parlamente.” TA3, 27 May 2019, at 
https://www.ta3.com/clanok/1156037/novi-slovenski-poslanci-v-europskom-parlamente.html.  
92 ĽSNS: Európsky parlament, at http://www.naseslovensko.net/kategoria/europsky-parlament/. 
93 Ibid., p. 6. 
94 Gabrižováet et al. op. cit., pp. 8. 
95 “Slovensko v prosperujúcej a bezpečnej Európe. OĽaNO, 2019”, ObycajniLudia, at   
https://www.obycajniludia.sk/volby-do-EP-2019/program. 
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traditions, values, origins and history”.96 Implicitly, Smer is highlighting the issue of mass 
migration of people with different cultural and religious background who might change the 
nature of European societies. Although the threat is not explicitly mentioned, the very general 
statement has clear narrative. Also, under this priority Smer-SD is stressing the issue of “not 
giving up the identity: that the definition of marriage, family and other cultural and ethical 
issues shall be solved at the national level.”97 This proclamation might be interpreted as the 
attempt to catch more conservative voters. Generally, reference to migration is not as direct as 
in the case of Kotleba-ĽSNS. 
As anticipated, in the case of Kotleba-ĽSNS migration presented as the threat plays a 
central role in the program. Mixed with other issues or standing alone migration is mentioned 
in four out of ten key messages of the magazine, which may substitute the program. For example 
Kotleba-ĽSNS claims, that the Members of the European parliament betrayed us and are 
flooding us with millions of migrants; They behave towards us like to a colony: they secretly 
vote in favor of LGBT laws, migration quotas and conclusions to increase number of Africans 
in Europe; Current EU policy is destroying Slovakia and Europe; or that Brussels is forcing us 
to accept migrants, promotes homosexuality, decadency and introduces political censorship.98 
Selected parts are presented emotively. As put by Miroslav Urban: “For my children, family 
and whole nation I would like to keep Slovakia national and Christian! I want our towns and 
villages being sounded with beautiful bells of churches, not screaming from mosques”.99 Next 
to the apparent focus on fear and emotions, there is possible clearly distinguish “we” and “them” 
apart from some obvious misinterpretations and false assumptions.  
In the area of migration, OĽaNO is in favor of keeping Schengen and free movement of 
persons. At the same time is in favor of strengthening of Frontex. According to OĽaNO, the 
migration crisis was wrongly communicated and was a source for the rise of populism. OĽaNO 
is for distinguishing between refugees and migrants, not connecting both groups and scaring 
people.100 It does not appear that party is using migration crisis as the topic to mobilize people, 
on the opposite: migration is communicated in very rational and moderate way and so are other 
presented threats and challenges. The main topics they seem to be fight against are tax frauds 
and the stop of North Stream 2. The rise of populism and hybrid warfare are seen as main 
dangers for Europe.101 Among the three mentioned parties OĽaNO is most critical towards 
Russia. 
Among three assessed Slovak parties only OĽaNO presented formal program providing 
more complex picture about key points: 1) Renewing trust in the European project; 2) 
cooperation in fight against corruption and tax frauds; 3) Retaining free movement of goods 
and persons and strict control of migration flows to Europe; 4) higher standard of living also 
thanks to fairer Euro funds; 5) support of family, health and education as the pillars of 
prosperity; 6) successful future of common currency; 7) foreign policy based on freedom, 
democracy and Christian culture; 8) Secure and Defensible Europe.102 As noted by observers 
OĽaNO positively communicated European integration project103 and expressed a negative 
position of Brexit: “Brexit is a showcase where a country might be led by irresponsible 
 
96 Smer SD, op. cit.  
97 Smer SD, op. cit. 
98 Noviny Ľudovej strany Naše Slovensko, op. cit.  
99 Ibid., p. 4. 
100 OĽaNO: Slovensko v prosperujúcej, op. cit. 
101 Euractiv.sk: “Dvojka OĽaNO: Záujmy Slovenska v EÚ? Schengen, daňové úniky a stopka pre-Nord Stream 
2”, Euractiv.sk, 9 May 2019, at https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/interview/dvojka-olano-zaujmy-
slovenska-v-eu-schengen-danove-uniky-a-stopka-pre-nord-stream-ii/. 
102 “Slovensko v prosperujúcej, op. cit. 
103 See Mesežnikov, op. cit. p. 77.  
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politicians and populists, who lies to the people”.104 From the presented parties OĽaNO is the 
least populistic, so it is a certain paradox that a party associated with populism is criticizing 
populists despite observable departure from some populist points present prior 2014 elections 
to the EP.  
To sum up, two Slovak parties associated with populism were hesitant to provide a clear 
program which allows them space for maneuvering. From the three parties ĽSNS is most 
critical in its rhetoric and positions of the party are based on serious misinterpretations. It seems 
that the party in pre-2019 elections abandoned its hardline position to leave the EU and opted 
for EU reform in the direction of European national and unanimous voting. Scaring people with 
migration and EU dictate associated with attack on traditional values played an important role 
in the party communication. Open pro-Russian and pro-Slavic rhetoric in the case of ĽSNS is 
changing into “bridge” politics of the Smer-SD. Similar were also calls for “defense of Slovak 
identity”. Contrary to ĽSNS, Smer-SD is less programmatically bounded which was 
demonstrated by just three program priorities. On the contrary OĽaNO has offered the most 
complex program with a constructive pro-European attitude, supportive to current trends of 
European integration e. g. strengthening of Frontex and limiting migration flows to Europe. 
Despite OĽaNO is generally associated with populism its program for the 2019 elections to the 
EP is absenting populist features. It is mainly political style of people associated with OĽaNO 
what lends the party label of being populist. As mentioned earlier, OĽaNO is weakly 
ideologically or value anchored, which may strengthen populist tendencies in the future as again 
observable before the 2020 elections to the National Council.  
Table 2. Code structure (Slovak parties) 
Party Code 
(=problem) 
Sub-codes (structure of party 
argumentation) 
Smer-SD EU Social equality in Europe 
 
Slovaks shall not be cheap working force abroad 
Slovakia as a “bridge” between West and East + 
renewing dialogue 
Russia as a partner 
Migration Not giving up identity: that definition of 
marriage, family and other cultural and ethical 
issues shall be solved at the national level 
Europe shall not forget about its traditions, 
values, origins and history 
Kotleba- ĽSNS EU Superiority of EU law over national law (EU 
dictate) 
EU elites betrayed Slovakia 
Having plan on how to reform EU (Europe of 
nations + unanimous voting) 
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Slovakia is like colony: cheap labor for foreign 
factories 
EU forcing LGBT ideology and promotes 
homosexuality 
Current EU policy is destroying Slovakia and 
Europe 
EU project is paid (on expense of) Slovak 
families + EU is trying to destroy traditional 
family 
We will prevent war with Russian Federation 
(against the will of the “lords of the power” in 
Brussels) 
EU dictates production quotas and economic 
rules 
EU is a political project led by globalists and 
introduces political censorship 
Migration Result of betrayal by EU elites 
EU dictates to accept migrants 
Slovak Members of the EP voted for more 
Africans in Europe 
EU push that states of the EU shall financially 
compensate Africans for 500 years of slavery 
Schools and multicultural institutions shall 
introduce “Week of black history” forcing 
children to learn of positive African examples 
EU push that share of Africans in the politics 
and media shall increase 
EU shall create billions in eurofunds to support 
living of Africans in Europe 
EU proposes that member states shall build-up 
new legal ways of migration from Africa to 
Europe 
OĽaNO EU Repairing instead of destroying “European 
house” + Renewing trust in the project 
Cooperation against corruption and tax fraud 
Higher standards of living + fairer Eurofunds 
Support of family, health and education for 
prosperity 
In favor of the Euro 
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Foreign policy based on freedom, democracy 
and Christian culture 
Secure and Defensible Europe 
Migration Retaining free movement of goods and persons 
Distinction between migrants and refugees + 
against scaring people with migration 
Enhancing Frontex + controlling migration 
flows to Europe 
 
3.4. Poland 
The 2019 elections to the European Parliament in Poland were the second in a series of four 
elections held within a short period of time. This ballot, after the local elections that took place 
in autumn 2018, was the second significant test of popularity of the ruling Eurosceptic and 
populist political party – the Law and Justice (PiS). The turnout in the European Parliament 
was unusually high, as 45.68% of those entitled to vote exercised their right. It is worth noting 
that five years earlier, only 23.83% of citizens took part in the 2014 European elections in 
Poland. It was the result of a great mobilization of Poles, both supporters of the government 
and the electorate of the opposition united by the broad European Coalition. This wide electoral 
alliance was established by the following political parties: The Civic Platform (PO), the Polish 
People’s Party (PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the Modern (N), and the Greens. In 
2019, the best election result was achieved by the ruling party, the Law and Justice, which 
received 6,192,780 votes (45.38%). This victory gave it 27 seats. The European Coalition was 
supported by 5,249,935 votes (38.47%). The coalition won 22 seats. There were also three other 
triumphant candidates representing the new political group formed at the beginning of February 
2019 – Robert Biedroń’s Spring with him as its leader. This grouping received 826 985 votes 
(6.06%). The candidates representing the right-wing KORWiN Confederation, Liroy, and the 
Nationalists received the support of 4.55% of the voters. The fifth place was taken by the 
populist Kukiz'15 with 3.69% of votes and the leftist party – Left with a score of 1.24%. None 
of these groups exceeded the required electoral threshold and did not receive seats.105 For 
Kukiz'15 it was the third election in which this grouping took part. 
Law and Justice is one of the most influential Polish political parties today. Established 
in 2001, in 2005 took the helm of the Polish government for two years. After shortening the 
term of office and the snap parliamentary elections in 2007, it joined the opposition. The Party 
won far and wide the parliamentary elections in 2015 by obtaining an absolute majority of seats, 
and has been ruling in Poland since then. It somehow managed to overcome the strategy of 
“scaring the PiS back into power”, which had been used by the Civic Platform party after taking 
over power in 2007.106 The strong polarization of power between PiS and PO on the Polish 
party scene was clearly confirmed, as in 2007 and 2011.107 The second consecutive victory in 
the Sejm (the lower house of the parliament) elections in 2019 allowed PiS to continue its rule. 
However, this year it lost its majority in the Senate (the upper house of the parliament) where 
most of the seats were won by the opposition parties. The very good result in the elections to 
 
105 Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (PKW), Wyniki wyborow do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2019, (oficjalna strona 
PKW) [National Electoral Commission, Results of elections to the European Parliament 2019 (official website of 
National Electoral Commission], at https://pe2019.pkw.gov.pl/pe2019/pl/wyniki/pl. 
106 See Szczerbiak, Alex: “An anti-establishment backlash that shook up the party system? The October 2015 
Polish parliamentary election”, European Politics and Society & Cultures, vol. 18, nº. 4 (2018), pp. 404–427. 
107 See Jasiewicz, op. cit. 
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the European Parliament in June 2019, preceding the parliamentary elections in Poland, 
confirmed the Party’s dominant position. PiS, in addition to the Samoobrona party (which co-
governed with PiS in 2006–2007 but no longer exists in the Polish political party system), and 
the insignificant League of Polish Families (right-wing populism), since 2005 has been 
classified among the populist parties.108  
Kukiz’15, according to the Political Party Act 1997 is not formally a political party, but 
it is an association. Its political aspirations were clear from the very beginning. This political 
group was created in July 2015 just before the parliamentary elections held in the same year, 
and immediately after an extraordinary result obtained in the presidential elections by its leader, 
the rock singer Paweł Kukiz. It was an unprecedented outcome of the first round of presidential 
elections giving a musician as much as 21% of votes.109 This political potential was transformed 
into building a political power; however, Mr. Kukiz declared his opposition to party structures 
and the existing nomenclature. Debuting in the 2015 parliamentary election, Kukiz'15 received 
8.81% of the votes and as many as 15 seats. After subsequent elections to the Sejm, which took 
place in autumn 2019, this movement secured 5 seats in the lower chamber of the Polish 
parliament. Kukiz'15 candidates were presented on the lists of the Polish People's Party as part 
of the Polish Coalition formed by PSL. This grouping currently has no representation in the 
Senate – the Upper House of the Polish Parliament. Kukiz'15 initially described itself as a 
nonideological movement (despite its creation mainly by people with strongly right-wing 
views). However, it later identified itself as a socially conservative group, and in terms of the 
economy - liberal. The main postulate of the grouping is to bring about political changes in 
Poland by introducing primarily: a semi-presidential system, FPTP system in single-mandate 
constituencies in elections to the Sejm, and referenda without the required validity thresholds. 
It is also significantly different from PiS and is a typical representative of right-wing populism. 
It is not only populist in its program, but also in the statements of its members, especially the 
leader.110 
It should be emphasized that both groups benefit from the use of the division 'we versus 
they'. As Ben Stanley and Mikołaj Cześnik rightly admit, comparing PiS and Kukiz'15 in terms 
of the nature of populism, which they postulate, indicate that these movements “represent 
respectively two separate streams of populism in post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe: radical anti-liberal criticism of the political status quo and ideologically 
amorphous anti-establishment appeal, based primarily on the rejection of the moral legitimacy 
of existing elites”111. 
Law and Justice at its European election convention presented the “European 
Declaration. Poland – the heart of Europe.” Interestingly, during the European Parliament (EP) 
election campaign the most important PiS proposal, and the one that was given a lot of attention, 
was a social project for Polish citizens included in the five tasks of the party's politicians called 
“The New Five”. It assumed the introduction of the so-called 500 Plus, which is a monthly 
allowance for each child in the family, the so-called the thirteenth, additional annual bonus 
payment for pensioners, income tax exemption for persons under 26, reduction of income tax 
for citizens, and further development of the highways network. This clearly indicates the 
orientation of this group’s political project on the Polish market, even during the European 
 
108 See van Kessel, op. cit., p. 145. 
109 Rydliński, Bartosz: “Polen,” in Fislage, F. and Grabow, K. (eds.) (2019): Bewegungen als Herausforderung für 
politische Parteien?, 2nd Ed., Berlin, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, p. 18. 
110  See Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, Marta and Kołodziejczak, Małgorzata: “Jak rozwalić system – 
– populistyczny dyskurs polityczny na przykładzie wypowiedzi Pawła Kukiza [Knocking down the system. 
Populism in Paweł Kukiz’s political discourse]”, Etnolingwistyka, vol. 29 (2017), pp. 225–244. 
111 See Stanley and Cześnik, op. cit., pp. 67–87. 
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elections. In the EU affairs, PiS presented the need for a fundamental reform of the foundations 
and the way the community functions. According to this party, the operational mode of the 
European Union should be changed, to allow the member states and their governments to play 
the key role. PiS also wanted to build other European agreements within the Union. The party 
declared its desire to relax the EU's climate policy and announced that it would not lead the 
introduction of Poland’s Eurozone membership. 
Kukiz'15 started the European elections in 2019 with the slogan “Poland in Europe, 
Europe for Poland”. In its program “Strategy of Change for Europe”, the grouping proposed 
five chapters with the propositions of changing EU that were intended to be implemented after 
the 2019 EP election112. The leader of the grouping at the election convention which took place 
on April 28th, 2019 emphasized that the idea of equality was included in his group's slogan. He 
clearly pointed out that there should be equal opportunities and equal rights for all countries in 
Europe, “it is unacceptable that the European Commission has a hold over Europe, and 
effectively serves only the interests of two countries, such a peculiar marriage of Macron and 
Angela Merkel. The fight for equal rights for all citizens of the European Union unites us all”113. 
Paweł Kukiz, dissociating himself from denying the existence of the EU, emphasized that “we 
do not want to destroy the Union, but we want to defend it against old parties that are destroying 
the Union in front of our eyes.” The members of Kukiz'15 repeatedly stated that “the EU is a 
body that is very useful, but not democratic enough”114. The Kukiz'15 candidates were against 
the introduction of the euro in Poland, they also spoke negatively about European reforms 
regarding environmental protection, e.g. in the area of resignation from coal energy. These 
politicians criticized the relations between some of the states of the European Union. According 
to Kukiz'15 some Community states are too dominant and this should be changed, e.g. by 
introducing direct democracy. Even before the election, there were several meetings of this 
political group with the European populist parties. Even before the EP elections, Kukiz'15 
formed an alliance with the Italian Five Star Movement and the Croatian Living Wall (whose 
leaders, respectively, Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio and Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, 
hosted the group's electoral convention. Other representatives of the alliance from Greek 
AKKEL party and the Finnish Now movement, as well as a new coalition member in the 
alliance - the Estonian party 'The Wealth of Life:' together with its leader Artur Talvik did not 
attend the convention Kukiz'15). 
It should be remembered that Poland in 2015 did not accept immigrants coming to the 
European Union. Little space was devoted to the problem of migration in the PiS European 
Declaration. The party referred to this issue only in its twelfth point of the electoral program, 
entitled “STOP illegal immigration”, proclaiming in the program that “We want Europe to help 
in places of conflict. We oppose illegal immigration”. During the party's convention, Prime 
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki emphasized that Europe is strong in its diversity, and Poland is 
able to give a lot to the EU. In addition, he added that “We are sending a strong representation 
to the EP that will defend the Polish raison d’état. We want to influence the fate of Europe. 
Together with V4, we have already managed to change the migration policy. I believe that the 
spirit that is within us will allow us to realize our ambitions for a better life for Polish 
 
112  Program Kukiz’15 “Strategia zmiany dla Europy”, oficjalna strona Kukiz’15, [The Kukiz'15 program 
"Strategy of Change for Europe", (official website of Kukiz'15)], at http://kukiz15.org/program/europejski. 
113 “Kukiz ogłosił hasło na wybory, mówił o “małżeństwie” Macrona i Merkel [Kukiz announced the slogan for 
the election, talked about the “marriage” of Macron and Merkel]”, TVN24, 28 April 2019, at 
https://tvn24.pl/polska/kukiz-przedstawil-haslo-kukiz15-na-wybory-do-europarlamentu-ra931228-2302644. 
114 “Kukiz w Chorwacji: chcemy obronić UE przed starymi partiami, które ja niszczą” [Kukiz in Croatia: we want 
to defend the EU against the old parties, which are destroying it], PAP, 18. March 2019, at 
https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C422351%2Ckukiz-w-chorwacji-nie-chcemy-zniszczyc-ue-ale-obronic-
przed-starymi. 
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families”115 . Neither he nor the party chair expressed detailed proposals for resolving the 
migration crisis in the EU. 
During the election campaign to the EP, the Kukiz'15 group announced that a new model 
for managing migration flows must be introduced, but – like PiS – without indicating specific 
solutions. During anti-system grouping conferences in Zagreb, Croatia on March 17, 2019, 
Paweł Kukiz asked rhetorical questions, indicating that “mainstream media and old party 
politicians call us Europhobes, populists, people who want to destroy the EU. They are afraid 
that the EU will break down because of us. I will ask you a few questions: have we caused the 
EU crisis? Are our groups responsible for the uncontrolled influx of immigrants and the 
migration crisis?”116.  
The European Parliament election manifesto of PiS “European Declaration” 117 
contained 12 points, referring to the twelve stars on the European Union flag. All of them were 
strongly focused on securing Poland's interests in the European Union. Among them were 
announcements about actions to: strengthen Europe of values – that is, action to return to the 
values of the EU, which its creators proclaimed and which were to be its foundation; Family 
Europe – defending the rights of parents to raise their children; actively supporting the interests 
of Polish farmers on the EU forum; promise to negotiate a new EU budget favorable for Poland; 
supporting equal treatment of Polish companies on the European market. As the sixth point, 
PiS included effective efforts to secure and protect the external borders of the Union, as well as 
activities for the energy security of Poland and Europe. Then came the slogans of struggle for 
equal treatment and equal access to products of the same quality for all consumers across 
Europe, as well as the elimination of double standards in the treatment of countries within the 
EU. In addition, in the face of contemporary environmental challenges, PiS announced that the 
European climate policy would also take into account Polish interests. Strong, strengthened 
cohesion policy – sustainable development would become the basis for rapid and solid 
development of the EU. In the last point, the PIS referred to immigration problems in Europe 
and stopping the influx of illegal migrants. The then PiS Chief of Electoral Campaign to the EP 
Tomasz Poręba emphasized that there is no consent for a European Union in which the stronger 
will decide what the whole Union and Europe should look like118. In turn, the chairman of the 
party, Jarosław Kaczyński assured at the PiS election convention on March 9, 2019 that his 
party would win “among others so that no one could say that what France is allowed, Germany 
is allowed, Poland is not allowed”. He emphasized that Poland has the same rights in the 
European Union as the largest states of the Community119. 
The ten proposals that Kukiz'15 presented on the basis of the five chapters of his 
Program “A strategy for change for Europe” were hidden under the following slogans: (1) “A 
Europe closer to its citizens – direct democracy and e-democracy”, i.e. bringing Europe closer 
to its citizens and making the influence of citizens more real on what is happening in the 
European Union; (2) “Beyond the right and left – rejection of anachronistic artificial divisions, 
work for citizens”; (3) “Honest Europe – fight against corruption and organized crime”; (4) 
“The new future of the Europe project – cooperation while respecting national identity”; (5) 
“Deep reform of EU institutions – strengthening the position of the European Parliament”; (6) 
 
115  Deklaracja Europejska [European Declaration], at http://pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/dla-nas-europejskosc-to-
lepsze-zycie-polakow. 
116 Kukiz w Chorwacji [Kukiz in Croatia], op. cit. 
117 Deklaracja Europejska [European Declaration], op. cit. 
118 “PiS zaprezentowało Deklarację Europejską. “12 punktów, tak jak 12 gwiazd na fladze UE” [PiS presented the 
European Declaration. “12 points, like the 12 stars on the EU flag”], IAR PAP, at 
https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/2275078,PiS-zaprezentowalo-Deklaracje-Europejska-12-punktow-tak-
jak-12-gwiazd-na-fladze-UE.  
119 Ibid.  
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“Improving the quality of life of citizens – public health and environmental protection”; (7) 
“Movement of persons and security – a new model for managing migration flows”; (8) “Fair 
Europe – limiting the impact of financial markets and protecting the real economy”; (9) 
“European quality – protection of products manufactured in Europe and development of 
agriculture” and (10) “Faith in our future – creation of programs for young Europeans”120. The 
group’s leader Paweł Kukiz, in his speech at the April Election Convention in 2019, explained 
the points of his group's program. He stressed that the most important proposals, which should 
be implemented in the EU to talk about a Europe of equal opportunities is the introduction of 
democracy, which he understands as the real influence of the citizens on their region, country 
and Europe, is the introduction of instruments of direct democracy, for example the possibility 
of voting via the Internet (e-voting). Kukiz also mentioned honesty, which he understood as the 
fight against corruption. He requested the introduction of greater transparency in the 
functioning of the European institutions. Moreover, he underlined the cooperation of all EU 
nations while respecting national identity. He also spoke about the demands for equal co-
financing for farmers from various regions of the European Union, about unequal wages in 
various European countries, and about the introduction of a minimum wage in Poland at the 
level of salaries of parliamentarians. He also pointed to the introduction of European quality of 
life and food in all countries of the European Union, the end of the dictates of corporations, 
enabling young generations to develop so that they could remain in their homeland and the end 
of the division into left and right in politics. 
To sum up, the election campaign for the European Parliament in Poland was an 
important test for the ruling PiS party and an important test for the systematically losing 
Kukiz'15 in polls. PiS largely focused its postulates on matters related to the status and well-
being of Polish families, in view of the fight for dominance in the Polish parliament, which was 
to take place in autumn 2019. During the campaign, Kaczyński emphasized that elections to the 
EP and to the national parliament, “are in fact, one election in which the future of Poles and 
Poland is at stake.” He threatened that it would be worse for Poles if the ruling party lost the 
election, the situation of Poles would worsen. Kukiz'15 in its EP campaign focused on 
defending Poland's position within the EU. Both groups declared the need for reform and 
change in the EU and the need to solve the migration crisis, albeit without indicating specific 
actions. 









Must be reformed 
Return to the original values of Europe  
Equal treatment for every member of (company in) 
EU within EU 
Support for national (Polish) agriculture  
 
120 “Kukiz od poniedziałku zacznie przedstawiać 10 postulatów działań na rzecz zmian w Europie [From Monday, 
Kukiz will start presenting 10 postulates of actions for change in Europe]”, WNP.PL, 9 March 2019, at 
https://www.wnp.pl/parlamentarny/wydarzenia/kukiz-od-poniedzialku-zacznie-przedstawiac-10-postulatow-
dzialan-na-rzecz-zmian-w-europie,37846.html. 
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Solidarity in development within Europe. 
Strong cohesion policy 
Migration 
Stop illegal immigration. 
Europe have to help others 
Safe borders of Europe 
Cultural threat 
Solution on the level of nation states  
KUKIZ’15 
EU 
Must be reformed  
(deep reform of the EU institutions, including, 
strengthening the position of the European 
Parliament and e-voting) 
Strong Poland in Europe! 
Rejection of anachronistic, artificial divisions and 
work for citizens 
Honest Europe – fight against corruption 
Stop the hegemony of superpowers (of Germany and 
France) in EU 
Migration 
A new model for managing migration flows 
Possible source of conflict 
Supported by EU, reasonable decisions, above all, in 
compliance with the law 
 
3.5. Hungary 
As expected, Fidesz-KDNP has won the 2019 European Parliament election in Hungary, held 
only a year after the national parliamentary elections, with a percentage of 52.56% (converted 
to 13 seats). The left-wing Democratic Coalition (DK) earned 16.05% (4 seats), significantly 
improving their percentage of 5.37% the year before, and too much surprise, the centrist/liberal 
Momentum Movement primarily targeting the youth earned 9.93% (2 seats). Both the socialist 
MSZP-P (6.61%) and the radical nationalist Jobbik (6.34%) lost support and each of them could 
only delegate one representative to the EP, while the Hungarian green party Politics Can be 
Different (LMP) failed to gain any seats.121 The election brought about a complete reshuffling 
of the ranking of opposition parties, and also defined the opposition strategy for the 2019 
Hungarian local elections, based on the necessity of complete alliance against the incumbent 
Fidesz party. 
 
121  2019 European elections result, at https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-
results/hungary/2019-2024/.  
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When looking for obvious signs of populism in Hungarian parties, it must be underlined that 
the communication of each party includes populist, strongly demagogic elements. However, 
since 2010 the populist national component is permanently present in the politics of two 
political entities, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance and Jobbik. Fidesz was founded in 1988. As the 
party that represented the youth generation played a significant role in the Hungarian regime 
change. Fidesz’s primary goal was a decisive opposition to democracy. In 1993, Viktor Orbán 
and other leaders of Fidesz decided to change the ideological profile of the party and took steps 
to transform it from a liberal into a right-wing group. Later Fidesz introduced itself as a party 
that protests against the liberalization of the state and power being exercised by the former 
communist elite moreover that protects Hungarian interests and domestic economic market. 
Since 2010, Fidesz is known as a right-wing national-conservative-Christian party.122 Jobbik 
was founded as a political party in 2003 as a new generation, radical right-wing political party. 
At the elections in 2010 the party reached 16.67%, not only enabling them to sit in the 
Parliament, but also establishing themselves as an essential factor in Hungarian politics. At the 
end of 2014 Jobbik took a radical turn launching a new political direction from a radical party 
to a moderate centrist right-wing party. After the elections in 2018 the party has lost its support 
gradually.123 
Hungarian populism cleverly builds upon century-long desires of the Hungarian psyche, 
i.e. revolt against oppression, ideas of liberty and independence, as well as the historical aspects 
of scapegoating. It readily refers to unspoken issues of the period following the regime change 
(1989-1990), the lack of self-reflection and public disputes, as well as the impacts of foreign 
(alien) influence and the reinterpretation of consequences.124 The false reality manifested in the 
idea of “eternal hope, followed by great disappointment”. 
The campaign issues and results of the 2019 European Parliament election in Hungary 
cannot be understood without knowing the preliminaries to the fact. Hungary has practically 
been experiencing a permanent election campaign since the autumn of 2006, following the leak 
of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s supposedly secret speech in which he had admitted 
continuously lying to the Hungarian people. Therefore, even less important elections had their 
stakes increased, enabling citizens to express their dissatisfaction or support.  
 EP campaigns are generally met with disinterest from voters, people cannot understand 
and see how and why they should interfere with European issues through an election that still 
features national parties and candidates.125 While the 2009 EP election could clearly be counted 
as a vote of protest against the incumbent left-wing and liberal bloc, the election in 2014 and 
2019 adapted the vision on the future of the European community to a national level. It has 
become clear that the decision made on the European Union is basically defined in terms of 
national policy issues. This notion is supported by the fact that while the 2014 EP election only 
had a 28.92% turnout, in 2019 it increased to 43.48%, mainly because of the migration crisis 
and the impact of the related government propaganda efforts.126 
 
122 Kubas, Sebastian and Czyż, Anna: “From a Liberal Opposition Party to a Right-Wing Party of Power. Three 
Decades of the Hungarian Fidesz (1988-2018)”, Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, vol. III, Sectio 
M (2018), pp. 47–65. 
123 Pap, Norbert and Glied, Viktor: “The Hungarian Border Barrier and Islam”, Journal of Muslims in Europe, vol. 
6 (2017), pp. 1–29. 
124 Ágh, Attila: “A rendszerváltás terhe: A neoliberális-autoriter hibrid Magyarországon”, Project: Declining 
democracy in East-Central Europe (2019), pp. 1–26, at  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331345963_A_rendszervaltas_terhe_A_neoliberalis-
autoriter_hibrid_Magyarorszagon.  
125 Navracsics, Tibor: “Az első jelentős európai parlamenti választás elé”, Magyar Szemle, vol. 26, nº. 1–2 (2019), 
at http://www.magyarszemle.hu/cikk/20190222_az_elso_jelentos_europai_parlamenti_valasztas_ele.  
126 European Parliament representatives election 2019, at https://www.valasztas.hu/ep2019. 
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Since January 2015, public discourse in Hungary is dominated by the topics of mass migration, 
dangers of terrorism, crisis of multiculturalism, Soros-organizations supporting migration and 
the doings of bureaucrats in Brussels. Although the government communicates that it is 
protecting Hungarian people, such efforts are put into context by the fact that almost 20 000 
foreign citizens purchased (permanent) residence permits in Hungary from 2013 to 2017. In the 
framework of the residency bond program initiated by the Orbán-cabinet, 6543 purchasing 
citizens of 59 countries and their more than 13300 family members got Hungarian documents, 
for which they paid hundreds of thousands of euros.127 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán explains 
whenever he is given a chance to speak that Hungary is a key player in EU decision-making 
related to migration, however it should also be highlighted that the Hungarian government has 
repeatedly hindered and blocked decisions aiming to mitigate the pressure of migration. This 
happened to the treaty concluded at the EU-Africa Summit in April 2018, which would have 
assisted African countries in impeding migration and provided financial help to returning 
migrants, but the same thing happened with the treaty of the EU with the Arab League in 
February 2019, which was rejected by the Hungarian government, because the wording made 
reference to UN migration compact (then still under negotiation). Jobbik – and other parties as 
well – suggested that Europe should provide support to third countries issuing migrants to 
promote economic development and the development of social care systems, stating the 
following: “We have always professed that everyone must be given a change to get by in their 
home countries. People from the third world should be supported in their homeland, not in 
Europe.”  
The years-long dispute about compromising the rule of law and deconstructing 
democratic institutional framework was manifested in the report about Hungary, made by the 
committee coordinated by Dutch MEP Judith Sargentini. The European Parliament adopted the 
report on the situation in Hungary with a majority of almost 70 percent on 12 September 2018, 
and launched the procedure against Hungary under Article 7 to its next level. 
In the following months, public discourse dominated by Fidesz-KDNP simplified the 
issues to the “trinity” of illegal immigration-EU-wrongdoings of George Soros and his 
organizations, and this theme also defined the EP election messages of the government.128 “No 
diktat or accusation of the European Parliament can make the Hungarian government change 
its immigration policy. [...] We are talking about a pro-immigration report with the exclusive 
objective of breaking the Hungarian government’s resistance against immigration and 
condemning the cabinet for protecting the borders of Europe,” explained Gergely Gulyás, the 
Minister of the Prime Minister's Office, subscribing to the government’s position. Following 
the adoption of the report, the government launched an “informative” campaign with the main 
message “You have the right to know what Brussels is planning to do”. The billboards depict 
George Soros laughing in the background, as well as a prominent EPP politician, European 
Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker who criticized the Hungarian government and 
Viktor Orbán many times. According to government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács “the plans of 
supporting migration are still kept in ‘Brussels drawers’”. [...] Such plans include multiplying 
funding for non-governmental organizations and creating a migration fund that would make 
illegal immigration lawful.” Following the openly anti-EU propaganda and the targeted attacks 
against EPP politicians, in February 2019 the European Commission reacted and labelled the 
statement of the campaign fake news and disinformation. On behalf of the commission, 
spokesperson Margaritis Schinas explained that the Hungarian campaign “beggars belief” and 
 
127 Wiedemann, Tamás: “59 országból jött Magyarországra a húszezer letelepedési kötvényes”, G7.hu (2019), at 
https://g7.hu/kozelet/20190116/59-orszagbol-jott-magyarorszagra-a-huszezer-letelepedesi-kotvenyes.  
128 Kacziba, Péter: “Political Sources of Hungarian Soft Power”, Politics in Central Europe, vol. 15, nº. 1S (2020), 
pp. 81–111. 
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added that ‘It is shocking that such a ludicrous conspiracy theory has reached the mainstream 
to the extent it has’.” 129  In the end, the workaround turned out to be Fidesz voluntarily 
suspending membership in the European People’s Party until the investigation is concluded 
against them.130 This was even favorable to Fidesz, since constant “preparedness” and keeping 
conflicts alive are important to mobilize their supporters. Since Fidesz did not have a program 
for the EP-elections, the party’s goals could be learnt from brochure: Do support Viktor Orbán's 
program and halt migration!  
From its foundation in 2003 up until its so-called “popular party shift” following the 
2014 elections, Jobbik has pursued strongly anti-EU, Eurosceptic politics. A remarkable 
example was a member of the party burning the EU flag at a rally in 2012, held against the 
European Commission’s decisions condemning Hungary. Then-chairman of the party, Gábor 
Vona explained that the Commission’s decision had been a declaration of war, aiming to 
terminate Hungary’s independence and suggesting that a referendum was necessary on exiting 
the community. Following their defeat in the 2014 national elections, Jobbik pursued a radical 
turn and gave up on its radical, far-right rhetoric to begin edging closer towards the political 
center. Unfortunately for them, this complete shift began at the same time as the outbreak of 
the migration crisis, allowing Fidesz to very cleverly confiscate and communicate Jobbik’s 
previously dominant topics. Due to constant political attacks, by 2019 the party has basically 
been decimated with its popular support halved in a few years.  
The EP election program of Jobbik called for a New National Compromise, aiming to 
replace political division and repeatedly reacting to crises with Europe becoming proactive and 
finding answers to solve issues related to its core values (Jewish/Christian heritage), institutions 
(reducing the enormous bureaucratic apparatus) and social tensions (suggested wage union). 
Priorities of the program are: 
1. Competitive Hungary and European wages 
2. Joint solution against migration 
3. Proper, free media 
According to the position of Jobbik, each member state shall contribute to protecting the EU’s 
external borders. Their rhetoric is very much similar to that of Fidesz: “[...] contrary to many 
western states, Hungary did not take part in colonization [...] so we do not intend to accept the 
victims of colonization en masse either.” 
Since Fidesz-KDNP has not issued a manifesto for the EP election, their accusations were 
summarized in Viktor Orbán’s seven-point letter addressed to the EU in April 2019: 
1. They want to introduce the mandatory resettlement quota. 
2. They want to weaken the border-protection rights of member states. 
3. They would foster immigration with a migrant visa. 
4. They want to provide even more money to organizations supporting migration. 
5. They would also assist migration with a bank card with accessible funds. 
6. They would launch experimental immigration projects with countries in Africa. 
 
129 Benková, Lívia: “Hungary-Orbán´s project towards “illiberal democracy””, Fokus, nº. 2 (2019), pp. 1–4, at 
https://www.aies.at/download/2019/AIES-Fokus-2019-02.pdf.  
130 Meijers, Maurits J. and van der Veer, Harmen: “MEP Responses to Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and 
Poland. An Analysis of Agenda-Setting and Voting Behaviour”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 57, nº. 
4 (2019), pp. 838–856. 
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7. They want to reduce financial support for countries that oppose immigration.131 
Thus, basically the communication of the government contrasted so-called economic migration 
(They – who are strangers; They – who are not part of our civilization) with supporting families 
(We, the Hungarians/Europeans). This was the most important message that voters understood 
furthermore most of the political debates were about the risk of migration from different 
perspectives since 2015, therefore Fidesz basically did not need a specific program for the EP 
election. Their communication contained the key message consequently: the supporters of 
immigration are not interested in supporting Hungarian families. Based on this way of thinking, 
the national government is on the “good side”, while forces supporting immigration are on the 
other side, aiming to increase population numbers of certain countries with migrants. These 
forces include: Brussels, George Soros and of course their puppets, the Hungarian opposition.132 




Sub-codes (structure of party argumentation) 
JOBBIK 
EU 




Physical threat (terrorism) 
Cultural threat  
FIDESZ-KDNP 
EU 
Must be reformed 
Freedom fight against Brussels 
Imperial endeavors to recolonize Hungary 
Led by George Soros and his network 
Migration 
Physical threat (terrorism) 
Solution on the national and supranational level  
Defending the European Christian roots from Islamic 
threat 
Supported by some EU member states 
 
4. Comparison and conclusions 
The analysis compared the characteristics of populist parties in the V4 countries, focusing on 
the 2019 EP elections. In all cases, elections provide an opportunity for adequate comparisons, 
as parties announce programs and/or orient voters along certain principles. EP elections are 
special political events because they bring issues, which have been part of the political dialogue 
already, though generally less discussed in domestic politics, to the surface. That means populist 
parties can utilize the EP elections for promoting their Eurosceptic and anti-Brussels opinions 
without reservations, emphasizing that supranational decisions affect internal affairs too. On 
 
131  Hutter, Marianna: “Íme, A Fidesz “programja”: migránsozás hét pontban”, Azonnali.hu (2019), at 
https://azonnali.hu/cikk/20190405_ime-a-fidesz-programja-migransozas-het-pontban.  
132 Timmer, Andria D. and Docka-Filipek, Danielle: “Enemies of the Nation: Understanding the Hungarian State’s 
Relationship to Humanitarian NGOs”, Journal of International & Global Studies, vol. 9, nº. 2 (2018), pp. 40–57. 
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the one hand, populist parties strongly criticize the operation of the European Union and 
Brussels’ bureaucracy, saying it is slow, slothful, not in the interests of citizens, but on the other 
hand – according to their claim – they do not want to leave the EU (Czechxit, Hunxit). This 
complicated political game creates a paradoxical situation in which the Eurosceptic attitude and 
the criticism of EU technocrats go hand in hand. While efforts are being made to reinforce 
nationalist, patriotic feelings against the EU supremacy by inventing new, often fictional 
narratives based on half-truth, with external actors and factors threatening both the EU and the 
V4 countries. Such as migration, and the civil society/NGO network financed by American 
billionaire George Soros, as part of the global clandestine power, the deep state as well as 
terrorism. The goal is to have a permanent threat against the country and that citizens must be 
protected from. 
Sometimes the “protection” is manifested in openly anti-Roma political speeches as it 
happened in Hungary and in Slovakia. There are states where this hate speech and campaign 
remained at the level of anti-corruption and anti-elite statements as in the Czech Republic and 
Poland, but the anti-migrant rhetoric showed up in every V4 countries. These abovementioned 
factors are complemented by the argument that many of these challenges are caused by the EU 
itself, by losing sovereignty and political self-determination of nation-states, promoting 
migration, which in the long run will erase European values and identity. It is very important 
to note that the rhetoric of populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe shows the need to 
reinforce social inclusion, the promise of a more responsible Europe, or the reduction of 
economic and regional inequalities, but meanwhile they want to strengthen the nation-state 
structure. This is a sharp contradiction that is difficult to explain that is why populist powers 
usually transform the existing or fictional threats to the arena what is less known by voters and 
probably these challenges are not there or hardly as much as the populist parties would like 
them to be. 
It should also be emphasized that there are differences in the behavior of the V4 
countries in a couple of cases. It is worth to mention the relationship with Russia, which 
seriously divides the Visegrad group, or the discourse on the future of the EU saying reforms 
should be executed within the community by deepening the whole political and economic 
cooperation, or on the contrary to strengthen the nation-state structure. It should also be noted 
that there are differences in terms of respect for the democratic framework, which, as we have 
seen, is in danger in Poland and Hungary.133 To sum it up, constant crises can stabilize the 
popularity of populist parties, 134  precisely because the EU is unable to provide effective 
responses to the emerged challenges (or at least many people believe it). However, as quickly 
as populist forces have strengthened, they may weaken and disappear if they are not able to 








133 Cianetti, Licia; Dawson, James and Hanley, Seán: “Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern 
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International Area Studies Review, vol. 21, nº. 2 (2018), pp. 150–168. 
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